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Debatable sphere: major party hegemony, minor party marginalization in the 
UK leaders’ debate 
Abstract 
The United Kingdom political landscape has historically been dominated by the two main 
political parties; Labour and the Conservatives. However, by the 2010 General Election their 
vote share had dropped to 65%. The 2010 election also saw a new development enter the UK 
political landscape—televised leaders’ debates, which featured the leaders of the three largest 
political parties. Discussions before the 2015 General Election resulted in a decision to repeat the 
debate experiment, but this time, partly due to changes in projected vote shares, seven leaders 
were invited to the main debate. Using content analysis of the debate, this research questions the 
presentation of the debate as a deliberative event. Participatory parity was not achieved in the 
debate—far from it. Instead the debate served to reinforce extant power differentials between the 
leaders of parties of differing political standings. 
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For much of the twentieth century, the UK operated with essentially a two-party political system. 
In the second half of the century, the Labour and Conservative parties typically shared over 80%1 
of the vote at General Elections and regularly swapped places as The Government or The 
Opposition. The Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) figure (Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979) for the UK averaged 2.36 from 1945-1970, and post-1970 rose to 3.21 (Gallagher and 
Mitchell, 2008). An alternative measure, the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP), 
more specifically measures the effective number of parties at the parliamentary or legislative 
level; this figure hovered around two from 1945 to the turn of the century. By 2010 the ENEP 
had risen to 3.72 and the ENPP to 2.57—clear illustration that the UK was moving slightly in the 
direction of a multi-party system. Slightly is emphasized, as the most recent available 
ENEP/ENPP figures for other comparable nations are: Spain 5.03/4.16; Germany 4.81/3.51; 
Australia 4.47/3.07; Canada 3.33/2.50. The ENEP/ENPP figures for Spain, Germany and 
Australia are, partly at least, illustrative of the opportunities afforded to multipartyism by 
different electoral systems, such as proportional representation. The parliamentary first-past-the-
post system, as used in the UK, is inimical to multipartyism, as argued by Duverger and his oft-
cited law; “the simple-majority single-ballot [i.e., simple plurality rule] system favors the two-
party system” (1954, p. 217).  
However, smaller parties have been gaining in prominence, and this increasing 
prominence saw an intriguing development prior to the 2015 General Election—the leaders of 
seven UK political parties were invited to participate in a live televised debate. Televised 
political debates are common in the UK, but leaders’ debates in such a format are new to the UK 
political arena; it was only in 2010 that the first one ever took place. Chadwick (2011) argues 
that this was possibly the most important development in politics-media relations in the UK since 
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televised coverage began in 1959.  The 2010 debates featured the leaders of the three biggest 
parties in the UK. The increasing complexity of the political arena was recognized in 2014/15 
and, following months of debates about the debates (see BBC, 2015a for a brief summary) by 
parties and the media organizations, an agreement was reached to broadcast two debates.  
Debate one featured the leaders of seven of the biggest political parties in the UK2. 
Debate two featured five of the same line-up, with Prime Minister David Cameron and Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg not in attendance. Due to this set-up, and the specific research 
question of interest, this research focuses on the first debate which occurred April 2, 2015. This 
was the first time that “minor” parties had shared an ostensibly equal platform. The debate was 
set-up to try to protect this equal access ethos with pre-agreed rules governing such factors as 
response time and response order. Leaders were given time for a one-minute opening and closing 
statement. Then, four audience questions (sight unseen) were asked, with each leader given one-
minute to respond. Following each round of timed responses, the debate was opened for “real” 
discussion of around 20-minute duration per question.  
Tully (2002) argues that there is increasing agreement that in a constitutional democracy, 
deliberation must be a requisite component. Dryzek echoes this sentiment, stating that 
“deliberation that is authentic, inclusive and consequential is central to democracy” (2009, p. 
1399). The debates were sold as an opportunity for the public to evaluate the credentials of the 
competing leaders—debaters in a televised agora where arguments would compete for public 
support. This research examines whether the debate could be considered as a contributor to 
deliberative democracy. The guiding research question being whether the April 2 debate should 
be considered as a deliberative event. 
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The normative model of representative democracy requires that individual groups of 
people elect a person (or persons) to represent them in some form of legislative or parliamentary 
body. The UK operates a first-past-the-post constituency-based voting system. Each of the 650 
Members of Parliament (MP) are chosen to represent a geographically bounded area of, on 
average, 70,000 constituents. However, although people ostensibly vote for their local candidate, 
it is largely the candidate’s party which drives most voting behavior. Indeed, one not atypical 
study shows that up to 75% of people cannot even name their MP (Hansard, 2013), but they will 
likely know for which party they voted. Almost inevitably in modern democracies, elected 
officials will belong to a political party, with a leader chosen from those officials to represent the 
views of the party officials, members and supporters. And although both party membership 
(Marshall, 2009) and alignment (Negrine, 2008) in the UK had been trending downward prior to 
2015, many of the millions watching the debate would have identified one (or more) of the 
participants as their representative in the debate, and/or their hoped-for future representative as 
Prime Minister. 
Deliberative theory focuses on communication processes of opinion and will-formation, 
deliberation being seen as an extension of representative democracy rather than a replacement of 
it (Chambers, 2003). The democratic model normatively presupposes an informed electorate, an 
electorate able to differentiate and choose between the political positions on offer. As 
Friedenberg (1994, p. xi) puts it: “From ancient Greece and Rome to the present, free societies 
have relied upon the vigorous clash of ideas in an open and free marketplace of ideas as a means 
of decision making.” Although there is no strictly agreed upon definition for what a debate 
should look like to afford deliberative democracy, deliberation presupposes some level of 
equitable participation. Fraser argues that, “participatory parity is essential to a democratic public 
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sphere and that rough socio-economic equality is a precondition of participatory parity” (1990, p. 
74). 
Though Fraser was clearly not discussing socio or economic disparities between political 
parties, the point is germane; there were clear political-power disparities amongst the leaders 
entering the television studio. The debate was sold to the viewing public as an opportunity to 
level this imbalance; the opening voiceover of the coverage intoned how viewers would see, 
“seven party leaders go face-to-face.” ITV News Director, Michael Jermey, in prior publicity 
stated that, “The programme will provide a fair forum for a proper debate between the party 
leaders” (ITV, 2015). Deliberative theorists have made attempts to empirically measure 
communicative acts in order to assess the quality of discourse. The updated Discourse Quality 
Index (DQI) by Steiner (2012) is one such measure. This index is rooted in the work of Jürgen 
Habermas (Steenbergen et al., 2003). Steiner (2012) notes that the empirical examinations he 
discusses were far from the “Habermasian normative ideal of equal and unconstrained 
participation” (p. 49).  This work uses the participation constraint from the DQI to illustrate the 
disparity in contribution to the debate. The index also contains elements to measure respect for 
other participants; these measures require inter-participant engagement as a starting point for the 
measure. This research borrows from these elements to illustrate how there was an imbalance of 
engagement by the leaders leading to marginalization of certain voices and prominence of others; 
specifically, how frequently leaders mention their opponents by name or party, and how 
frequently they disagree (and, at times, agree) with an opponent. A content analysis methodology 
is utilized to examine the debate texts and visuals. The findings here indicate that viewers were 
presented with a debate which reflected and relayed extant power hierarchies, thus disabling any 
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consideration of the debate as a deliberative event; this brings into question the role played by 
debates and has clear implications for the role of such debates in the UK political landscape.  
The Debate 
Political debate is of course as old as politics itself. The iteration of televising a debate with 
seven leaders was merely the latest evolution from a practice that can be traced to early 
democracies. Many scholars credit Habermas with reviving the idea of deliberation in recent 
decades (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Habermas (1989 [1962]) in his discussion of early 
politics, details how bios politikos, took place in the agora when lexis occurred. However, not all 
were invited to the discussion, as only a master of an oikos could participate. A replacement of 
the italicized words with political life, television studio, debate and political party, updates the 
point quite succinctly, and allows it to be borrowed analogously for this discussion. Calhoun 
(1992, p.1) writes that Habermas’ central question was to ask, “What are the social 
conditions…for a rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by private persons 
willing to let arguments and not statuses determine decisions?” In Habermas’ terms it should be 
“the forceless force of the better argument” (1975, p.108) which is the deciding factor in 
normative models of deliberative events, there should not be “intimidation by social or economic 
status” (Ferrell and Old, 2016, p.219). 
There is still frequent political programming scheduled in the UK and the multi-party 
debate format has been a fixture for many years, notably with the BBC program Question 
Time—first broadcast in 1979, and the show has long been a Thursday evening staple that helps 
establish, “the rhythms of the British media’s regular politics, commentary and opinion cycle” 
(Chadwick, 2011, p.27). The leaders’ debate was scheduled for a Thursday to fit in with this 
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cycle. Despite this history of political debate, it took many years of discussions before televised 
leaders’ debates became a reality in 2010 (see Bailey, 2011, for a historical context). 
Consequently, there is very little research on the role of televised leaders’ debates in UK politics. 
 U.S. presidential debates however have been the focus of much study. Most notably 
perhaps the Kennedy-Nixon debates which decades later were still objects of interest. Benoit and 
Harthcock (1999) analyzed how the candidates used acclaim, attack and defense as rhetorical 
strategies. Kraus (1996) evaluated the veracity of the claims of differing interpretations of debate 
victor between radio listeners and television viewers. Druckman (2003) used the passage of time 
and a novel experimental model to further investigate that claim. The Lincoln-Douglas debates 
were subjected to close textual analysis a century after they occurred, and with further update 50 
years later still (Jaffa, 1959; Jaffa, 2009). Of course, a presidential system is different to a 
parliamentary system in that, ostensibly at least, voters do not vote for the Prime Minister in a 
parliamentary system but rather their local constituency representative—one of the reasons why 
televised leaders’ debates were so long in arriving to the UK, and indeed remain an object of 
contention.  
Pattie and Johnston (2011) in their analysis of the 2010 UK leaders’ debates confirmed 
what was much reported at the time, that Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg’s performance in 
the debates had a significant impact on support for his party. Though they note that the initial 
bump in support following Clegg’s debate performance (particularly the “I agree with Nick” 
debate3) maybe did not endure and translate into voting outcomes. Wring (2011) argues that 
Clegg’s performance may have even been injurious to Liberal Democrat fortunes as it resulted in 
some of the Conservative Party and conservative press to increase attacks on Clegg’s party. In 
2010, no one party returned a sufficient number of MPs to form a majority government, resulting 
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in a coalition agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, with party 
leaders, David Cameron and Nick Clegg becoming Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
respectively.    
Following the reception of the 2010 debates, it was perhaps inevitable that they would be 
revisited in 2015. However, the same concerns which had inhibited previous attempts to stage 
debates resurfaced during the discussions between broadcasters and party officials. Initial 
proposals in late October 2014 were for a mixture of formats: one head-to-head featuring 
Cameron and Labour leader, Ed Miliband, a second to also include Clegg, and a third to which 
UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, would be invited. Cameron however rejected these proposals, 
arguing publicly that the Green Party should be invited. Many commentators however postulated 
that his intransigence on this point was more likely due to political considerations rather than 
lofty deliberative ideals—perceived wisdom is that the incumbent usually has the most to lose in 
a debate setting and therefore is likely to attempt to minimize such exposure where possible. The 
final format agreed, alongside the seven-way debate considered here, was a five-way 
challengers’ debate, constituent country debates in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and 
individual interviews with leaders (see Watson, 2015; BBC, 2015b; Padmanabhan, 2015 for 
further details).   
The novelty, media prominence, and presumed importance to electoral fortunes, of the 
2010 debates makes the descriptor of them as a “media event” (Dayan and Katz, 1994) quite 
apposite. They were certainly interruptions to the “normal flow of broadcasting and our lives” 
(ibid. p.5), and were live events transmitted in primetime on all major broadcast channels 
(though not simultaneously—broadcasters shared coverage).  The debates were heavily 
advertised in the preceding weeks by the broadcasters and were objects of extensive discussion 
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in all forms of media both pre and post-debate. An estimated 37% of the television audience saw 
at least some part of the first debate. A similar level of prominence was given to the eventually 
agreed on debate and interview series in 2015. This time, pre-publicity often focused on the new 
aspect of the inclusion of multiple parties. Though not as high as the viewership in 2010, the 
viewing figures for the April 2 debate show that many people did again interrupt their lives—
only the most popular soap operas and reality television shows were watched by more viewers 
that week.  
Though by no means the sole focus, much of the research on political debates has 
concentrated on debate performance and how it may have subsequently influenced electoral 
outcomes. However, what has been less well covered is the influence of pre-debate factors in the 
deliberative performance of the debate, specifically the political standing of those participating. 
Party standings 
Table 1 summarizes the history and political standing at the time of the debate of the parties 
participating. 
Before the debate, polling consistently predicted a hung parliament with no one party 
forecast to achieve a parliamentary majority, and a coalition would be required to govern. An 
election forecasting conference on 27 March, examining a wide range of polls, predicted the 
likeliest numbers of Members of Parliament by party4, which is detailed in Table 1, would result 
in no majority.  Therefore, it was manifest that there were essentially only two possible formats 
to such a potential coalition—a Conservative-led right-of-center coalition with David Cameron 
as Prime Minister (supported again by the Liberal Democrats), or a Labour-led left-of-center 
coalition with Ed Miliband occupying Ten Downing Street (supported by either the Liberal 
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Democrats and/or the SNP). I therefore argue that Cameron and Miliband entered the debate 
with a particular hierarchical advantage over the other leaders, and therefore belonged to a 
primary social stratum. Their coalition potential (Hopmann et al., 2012) places Clegg and 
Sturgeon in a secondary level, with Bennett, Farage and Wood occupying a tertiary level.     
Table 1. Party Summaries 
Party Founded Ideological 
orientation 
Core Issue Party Leader MPsa Pollingb Predicted 
MPsc  





n/a David Cameron (DC) 
(Prime Minister) 
306 33% 279 
Scottish National 
Party 







Liberal Democrats 1988 Center n/a Nick Clegg (NC) 
(Deputy Prime 
Minister) 
57 8% 23 
Plaid Cymru – The 














Nigel Farage (NF) 2 14% 3 
The Green Party 1985 Left-wing Environment Natalie Bennett (NB) 1 6% 1 
a. Number of Members of Parliament at the time of the debate 
b. Average of major national polling figures March 1 – April 1, 2015 
c. Figures based on election forecasting conference March 27, 2015  
d., e. The SNP and Plaid Cymru only stand candidates for election in Scotland and Wales respectively. Figures are given for 
UK-level polling followed by the respective country 
 
However, issue-ownership (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2003; Sides, 2006; Walgrave 
and de Swert, 2007) would predict that these levels need not necessarily be fixed through the 
debate. The concept of issue-ownership is of salience here, particularly with respect to core-issue 
parties. Political parties have traditionally been seen as having particular strength on certain 
policy areas. Parties of the right are typically seen as stronger on the economy and defense, and 
parties of the left granted greater authority on social welfare issues, to use the common 
examples. Core-issue parties are typically granted if not ownership, then at least “issue-interest” 
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or “competence” in/on that policy. One of the main areas debated during the program was the 
issue of immigration—an issue which Deacon et al. (2017) note was one of the issues most 
prominently covered in media coverage of the campaign. Cushion et al. (2015) note that UKIP 
were prominent agenda-setters in the 2014 European election cycle, and Hughes (2019) shows 
how prominently UKIP placed this issue in their news releases in the years prior to the debate. It 
is reasonable therefore to predict that on this issue, UKIP may be ceded ownership of the issue of 
immigration during the debate.   
Methods 
A content analysis was undertaken by hand by the author to examine the texts of the speech of 
the leaders and aspects of the media in the debates. The debate was viewed and transcribed by 
the author. There were a few instances where cross-talk made the audio impossible to transcribe 
or able to be transcribed but not possible to assign to a participant. These data were not included. 
Also not included were speech acts by the debate moderator or audience members. Conforming 
to Steiner’s (2012) work using the DQI, a single speech act was the unit of analysis used. That is, 
each time a leader spoke counted as a speech act. If a leader was briefly interrupted the text prior, 
and subsequent, to the interruption was counted as one speech act, and the interruption a separate 
speech act. As in the DQI, level of participation was recorded, operationalized as the number of 
speech acts and the duration of speech acts. Opening and closing statements for the debate plus 
the opening statement to each question were recorded as part of the total time speaking. These 
elements were all pre-agreed to be of one-minute duration and uninterrupted; something largely 
adhered to by all the participants. Speech acts outside these restricted (and presumably pre-
written and rehearsed) contributions were recorded as time debating. It is these “debating speech 
acts” which were coded to measure participation in the debate.   
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The DQI measures quality of interaction with other participants, operationalizing respect 
in terms of use of foul or respectful language or listening. Such a qualitative assessment is not 
undertaken here as an important precursor to such an assessment is whether participatory parity 
was achieved. The operationalization of participation however borrows from the DQI to measure 
how much other participants engaged with each other. For this, leader speech acts were coded for 
mentions of other leaders, mentions of other parties and (dis)agreements with other leaders. 
Personal mentions were invariably clear to code—typically first names or full names were used. 
David Cameron’s title of “Prime Minister” was used on occasion and coded as a reference to 
him. Party names were also usually obvious—typically shortened versions were used (e.g. “Lib 
Dems”, “ukip”) and “Tory/ies” used to refer to the Conservative Party. “This government” and 
“coalition” were coded as a reference to both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  
These data are best displayed visually (Figures 1 and 2) using network mapping 
techniques to illustrate leader engagement and how this engagement emerged. Therefore, 
network terminology is utilized in describing the methods and findings. The four measures of 
debate involvement were treated as ties between leaders, with leaders treated as nodes. Every 
time a leader was engaged with, their node size was increased by one, and the tie between that 
leader and the one engaging them also increased by one.  
Agreement and disagreement were coded using explicit verbal statements where it was 
both clear that the speaker was (dis)agreeing with a previous statement, and who they were 
(dis)agreeing with. Speech acts such as “I think Leanne makes a good point” (Cameron), “I’ll 
just say this Leanne…but you’re right” (Miliband) were coded as Cameron and Miliband 
agreeing with Wood. Similarly, “I would say to David Cameron his scares about free schools are 
wrong” (Miliband), “David said in his opening… that’s actually not the case.” (Sturgeon) were 
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coded as disagreements between Cameron and Miliband and Cameron and Sturgeon 
respectively, and also coded as personal mentions of Cameron by those leaders. 
The directionality of the link was also recorded, directing from the leader speaking to the 
leader/party they were addressing or (dis)agreeing with. The Sturgeon statement above for 
example was coded NSDC.  
A visual component was also included as a measure of inter-leader engagement (see 
Grabe and Bucy, 2009, for discussion of the importance of the consideration of visual cues). 
Camera shots were treated as directed links leader A  leader B when conforming to one of two 
stipulations: firstly, if leader B is shown in close-up while leader A is talking; secondly, if leader 
A is talking and leader B is shown in a shot with leader A where the shot is clearly intended to 
frame just the two leaders. Typically, such shots were done as reaction shots; that is, a leader 
whose name was mentioned or who was clearly pertinent to the current dialogue would be cut to 
for viewers to see their reaction. 
These are useful measures of engagement as they are specific speech acts by one debater 
which clearly directly engages with one of the other debaters. Such engagement also frequently 
leads to further engagement between the two, increasing the prominence of both. Though not an 
explicit requirement under most debate rules, it is often convention, as was usually observed in 
this debate by the moderator, that a participant who is engaged with in some manner, such as 
being named or disagreed with, is offered a right of reply. 
To explicate the network terminology and coding further: if, when speaking, David 
Cameron mentions Ed Miliband, a directed link DCEM was recorded; if Nick Clegg mentions 
the SNP a directed link NCNS was counted; if Leanne Wood agrees with Nigel Farage, this 
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constituted a directed link LWNF; and if Natalie Bennett is specifically framed while David 
Cameron is talking, a directed link DCNB was recorded. In each instance the second leader 
listed was recorded as having one additional in-degree value. Visually this translates in Figures 1 
and 2, to an increase in their node size by one, the link between them by one and the directed link 
between them by one. 
Four questions, asked by audience members, were debated, allowing analysis to also be 
undertaken on these separate elements of the debate, this illustrates how leaders may gain or lose 
prominence dependent on the area of policy being discussed. 
Findings 
The initial content analysis of the debate is indicative of a somewhat unequal debate. A basic 
frequency analysis, see Table 2, shows that Cameron and Miliband had significantly more 
opportunity to speak than the other leaders, most notably Sturgeon and Bennett (Cameron spoke 
twice as often as Bennett). Also, the total time spent speaking was significantly different, with 
Cameron’s 19 minutes 15 seconds being around six minutes longer than Bennett and Farage’s 
times and over eight minutes longer than Wood’s. 
The distinct elements of the debate were parsed out to separate the prepared statements 
(the opening and closing statements to the debate, and the opening response to each of the four 
questions) and the “debating speech acts.” The four questions asked by different audience 
members were on the economy, National Health Service (NHS), immigration and youthful hopes 
for the future (“youth future”), with about twenty minutes debate occurring for each question. 
Cameron had the most debating opportunity at 12 minutes 39 seconds, with Wood, Bennett and 
Farage getting around five, seven and eight minutes respectively. 




The leaders also illustrated clearly who they believed were worth attacking, mentioning 
or who could be ignored, as shown in Table 3. Cameron, or his party, was mentioned or referred 
to 96 times during the debate, 51 times by Miliband alone. Therefore, Cameron has an in-degree 
value of 96 for “mention” ties. The directed tie strength of MilibandCameron is 51. Miliband 
or Labour were referred to 76 times, around half of those references from Cameron 
(CameronMiliband is 35). At the opposite end of the scale, Natalie Bennett or the Green Party 
were referred to only once. Similarly, Cameron is disagreed with far more than any other leader, 
but almost nobody bothered to take issue with anything said by the three female leaders. 
The frequency analysis of camera shots used as others talked is also revealing. Along 
with his domination of talking screen-time, Cameron is also a favorite for reaction shots. Further, 
frequently as Cameron speaks, the shot cuts to Miliband, and vice-versa. 
 
 















Total time speaking 19:15 17:14 15:19 12:57 13:41 11:06 13:04 
Number of times spoke 34 32 29 19 27 23 17 
Spoke on:        
Economy 10 10 6 8 7 5 5 
NHS 7 8 6 4 5 6 4 
Immigration 7 5 8 3 10 5 3 
Youth future 8 7 7 2 3 5 3 
Total time debating 12:39 11:23 9:37 6:28 8:01 5:12 6:59 
Time debating on:        
Economy 3:23 3:11 1:57 1:59 2:04 1:11 1:54 
NHS 3:35 2:56 2:38 1:35 1:45 1:09 1:41 
Immigration 2:50 2:39 2:33 1:32 2:50 1:21 1:42 
Youth future 2:51 2:37 2:29 1:22 1:22 1:31 1:42 
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Table 3. In-Degree Measures of Leaders in the Debate and How Leaders Contributed to 


























Total in-degree of 
personal/party 
mentions 
96 76 29 10 25 8 1 
Total in-degree     
dis/agreement 27 18 15 8 11 6 0 
  Total in-degree 
camera shots 
84 44 28 16 28 9 5 
Total in-degree 207 138 72 34 64 23 6 
  In-degree source:        
David Cameron - DC -- 64 15 3 16 2 2 
Ed Miliband - EM 97 -- 14 7 4 7 0 
Nick Clegg - NC 35 18 -- 6 15 2 2 
Nicola Sturgeon -NS 27 23 17 -- 15 1 0 
Nigel Farage - NF 22 14 20 3 -- 7 2 
Leanne Wood - LW 9 16 4 0 8 -- 0 
Natalie Bennett - NB 17 3 2 15 6 4 -- 
  
Although, of course, it is not unreasonable for a sitting Prime Minister to be the most 
discussed, shown and attacked during a debate; Cameron had five years of governing for the 
other leaders to attack (as of course, to an extent, did Clegg), and the ostensible role of the debate 
was to allow them to present their case to replace him. Similarly, Miliband was the only possible 
alternative Prime Minister on the stage, so his prominence is also understandable. Yet the extent 
of prominence is the issue of question; to qualify as a deliberative event requires some level of 
participation equality. Their dominance of the economic question is illustrative of the uneven 
platform—between them they accounted for almost half of the debate time on the economy, an 
issue of obviously particular salience to voters.  
The figures in Table 3 give a clear illustration of the disparity of links between leaders. 
This unevenness of debate can be neatly visualized using network graphing techniques. In each 
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figure to follow, tie frequency is illustrated with the width of line connecting nodes, arrowhead 
size is illustrative of directed ties, and node size is illustrative of in-degree measure. Distance 
between nodes carries no significance—the tool is set to illustrate in a (2-D) spherical 
configuration. If one firstly considers Figure 1a as an example. The line connecting Nick Clegg 
(NC) and Cameron (DC) is proportionate to the 22 times one mentions the other leader or the 
other’s party. This compares to the much thicker line connecting Cameron and Miliband 
illustrating the 86 times they discuss each other or the other’s party (at the other end of the scale, 
no line connects Clegg and Bennett). The arrowhead going from EM to DC is proportioned to 
illustrate 51 mentions of Cameron or the Conservatives by Miliband and the reciprocal sized at 
35. The Cameron sphere is sized proportionally to illustrate that Cameron has 96 personal or 
Conservative Party mentions, compared to Natalie Bennett’s (NB) sphere of size 1. Figure 1b 
utilizes the same scaling system but illustrates (dis)agreements, 1c is based on camera shots and 
1d combines the four measures.  
These figures nicely illustrate several factors: the dominance of ties between Cameron 
and Miliband, the large disparities between in and out-links for both, the relative isolation of 
both Wood and Bennett, and the centrality of Cameron in particular. Bennett has a total in-
degree value of just six, and Wood 23, compared to Cameron’s 207 and Miliband’s 138.  
A co-occurrence analysis of undirected ties also illustrates the dominance of the 
Cameron-Miliband discussion. Here, the total speaking opportunities of both leaders served as 
the denominator, with the ties between leaders as the numerator. For “mention” ties, the 
Cameron-Miliband pairing has a co-occurrence figure of 1.30, the next highest figure for a 
pairing is Cameron-Clegg with 0.35. Similarly, for all ties Cameron-Miliband has a value of 2.44 
with Cameron-Clegg on 0.79. One can interpret this first figure as illustrating that any time either 
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Cameron or Miliband spoke, they were linked to the other in some way on average almost 2.5 
times. If directed links are considered, every time Cameron spoke, he links to Miliband 1.9 times 
on average, every time Miliband spoke, he links to Cameron just over three times on average. In 
contrast, the CameronWood and CameronBennett figures are both 0.06. For 
MilibandWood it is 0.22, for MilibandBennett it is zero. Essentially, these figures show that 
Cameron and Miliband largely just spoke to or about each other and almost completely ignored 
Wood and Bennett throughout the debate. 
These findings do question whether the debate even approached being a deliberative 
event. Indeed, is it accurate to say that Natalie Bennett even took part in a debate? Given that not 
one person (dis)agreed with her, her name was only used once, and her party never mentioned by 
anyone else can she be counted as a participant in a deliberative event?  
 
  
Figure 1a: Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Mentions 
Figure 1b: Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on 
(Dis)agreements 




Figure 1c. Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Camera Shots 
Figure 1d. Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Mentions, 
(Dis)agreements and Camera Shots 
 
The discussion above centered on Natalie Bennett and Leanne Wood, omitting discussion 
of UKIP leader Nigel Farage. This is because Farage, as already seen in Figure 1d, appears to 
have gained greater prominence in the debate than his fellow smaller party leaders. When the 
analysis is parsed out per question, it is clear why this is the case as the structure of the map 
changes considerably for one of the audience-posed questions. Figures 2a to 2c illustrate how 
Farage is a fringe figure for three of the questions, yet with immigration (figure 2d) he becomes 
the most central figure. Across the four questions, Farage had a total in-degree value of 69, the 
immigration question alone provided 50 of that value. Other metrics confirm this imbalance in 
his presence in the debate. Farage spoke 27 times in total, 10 of those on the immigration 
question. The average percentage of all debate time which leaders spent speaking on the four 
questions were: the economy 27%, NHS 25%, immigration 26%, and youth future 23%; 
illustrating a fairly balanced debate in terms of time devoted to the four questions. The 
commensurate figures for Farage were 26%, 22%, 35%, and 17%; considerably less evenly 
distributed. These figures supply a conservative estimate for how dominant the subject was for 
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Farage, as they assume that leaders kept on topic during each question section. Naturally, all the 
leaders wavered off-topic at time, but generally the debate kept on issue. Farage, managed to 
pivot to his core issues in most of his answers—out of the 27 total contributions he made to the 
debate, he mentioned immigration and/or Europe in 18. UKIP were clear owners of immigration 
during the debate, making them of interest for any viewers with a concern over that issue.   
  
Figure 2a. Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Mentions, 
(Dis)agreements and Camera Shots – Economy 
question. 
Figure 2b. Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Mentions, 
(Dis)agreements and Camera Shots – NHS question 
  
Figure 2c. Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Mentions, 
(Dis)agreements and Camera Shots – Youth future 
question. 
Figure 2d. Varying Directions and Strengths of Ties 
and Engagement of Leaders based on Mentions, 
(Dis)agreements and Camera Shots – Immigration 
question. 
 




This research aimed to evaluate whether the televised leaders’ debate of April 2 did provide a 
platform to allow for a debate, and a debate which could be considered a deliberative event. The 
answer appears to be a partial yes. It allowed for debate, but a debate that was dominated by the 
primary social hierarchy on the stage. It is clear that status was indeed a salient factor and not 
simply argument that held primacy. Dennis Thompson, though writing in the context of citizen 
participation in deliberative events, noted that, “equal participation requires that no one person or 
advantage group completely dominates the reason-giving process, even if the deliberators are not 
strictly equal in power and prestige” (pp. 504-5). The data here show that the representatives of 
the two major parties came to almost completely dominate, certainly for large parts of the debate. 
At one point in the economic discussion, 2.5 minutes of debate ensued simply between Miliband 
and Cameron, and the same debate partly continued through the remainder of that question 
section. Chambers remarks that, “a well-ordered deliberation is based on full information and the 
representation of all points of view” (2003, p. 319). Even here, in this limited and staged setting, 
in a format hammered out over months, viewers got to hear very little from some leaders about 
probably the most central policy issue in politics. At one point, moderator Julie Etchingham 
asked Nick Clegg, “austerity heavy or austerity light?” These were essentially the economic 
positions of the Conservative and Labour parties, and what Cameron and Miliband had been 
debating for the previous few minutes. The alternative point of view of government investment 
rather than austerity, shared by Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood, was barely heard. Dryzek (cited in 
Steiner, 2012) notes that participants should, “not possess authority on the basis of anything 
other than a good argument.” Cameron and Miliband were here ceded authority to set the 
acceptable bounds of economic possibilities. 
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To answer Calhoun’s synthesis of Habermas—apparently a seven-way televised leaders’ 
debate does not provide the requisite social conditions to remove status from the equation. David 
Cameron and Ed Miliband had an obvious hierarchical advantage which they were able to 
successfully “weaponize” (to borrow a term from the debate) to their advantage over others. It is 
very clear in terms of the differences between the primary and tertiary strata on stage with 
respect to Leanne Wood and Natalie Bennett. Nicola Sturgeon and Nick Clegg, in overall 
prominence, fall between these strata. It is of note that despite Sturgeon’s relative 
marginalization in the debate by these metrics, many commentators following the debate 
declared her the victor on the night—testament perhaps to the quality rather than quantity of her 
participation. The SNP recorded an historic victory in the election, almost completing a clean 
sweep of all seats in Scotland.  
The situation with Nigel Farage is complicated by the specific content of the debate. On 
most areas he is a marginal figure, but for the twenty minutes of debate on immigration he was 
very much center stage. Had a question been posed on the environment rather than immigration, 
Bennett may have achieved greater prominence but, given the level of her marginalization 
overall, it is hard to envisage her dominating that question in the same manner that Farage did on 
the topic of immigration. 
Were someone with no knowledge of UK politics to watch the debate, even without 
sound, it is highly probable that they could accurately predict who the most “important” people 
on the stage were. The co-occurrence figures relating Cameron to Miliband and 
Cameron/Miliband to Wood/Bennett are particularly revealing. The debate was presented as an 
opportunity for voters to be able to evaluate the full range of opinions of all parties on central 
political issues—not all positions appear to have been given equal opportunity to persuade. 
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Beyond questions of whether the debate could be considered a deliberative event, that should be 
of concern as a democratic failure. 
Of course, it should be recognized that the participants in the event were not seeking to 
provide a deliberative event. The debate was part of an election campaign, a “competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote” as Gutmann and Thompson (2004, p.14) note. The 2010 debates 
were a prominent media event, resulting in a real, or at least perceived, bump in support for the 
Liberal Democrats. The parties were therefore aware of the possible ramifications of a poor 
debate performance—leaders and parties were concerned with winning or, at least, not losing, 
rather than providing considered deliberation. The debate must be viewed as a part of 
majoritarianism—representatives being chosen according to majority voter wishes, and 
campaign debates have been likened more to advertising of product (politician/party) A as better 
than product B (ibid.). 
That a deliberative event did not occur is, therefore not surprising, what is however 
perhaps disappointing is that the debate, as illustrated with these data, could be discounted as a 
deliberative event without the necessity of any qualitative analysis of the debate text being 
undertaken. The relatively simple quantitative measures here were enough.    
The representative democracy model largely cedes decision-making on matters of import 
to a legislative body. Normatively, this smaller group of people—in this case, 650 MPs—is 
expected to deliberate prior to voting on such issues. Practically, of course, MPs are usually 
directed to vote along party lines in a manner prescribed by the party leadership. It is these same 
leaders who are often called upon in parliament to elucidate their party’s position on the issue of 
consideration. In the debate here under discussion, seven people were chosen to stand for those 
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650 representatives, their constituents and those people who share their views. This distillation to 
a manageable number of participants did not seem to afford the representative deliberation 
requisite in a normative representative democracy. Polling ahead of the debate placed the Green 
Party on around 6% of votes and UKIP on 14%, a potential 1.8 and 4.3 million voters 
respectively. It is questionable whether Bennett was given an opportunity to adequately represent 
the views of those people in the debate. In the debate, Farage, who had been chosen by UKIP to 
represent the views of their 624 candidates standing for election, was unable to represent in depth 
outside a narrow range of policy areas.   
The inclusion, for the first time, of seven leaders on a stage to debate political issues 
appeared to mark a change in the political landscape of the UK. Yet, six weeks later, electoral 
status quo returned with a Conservative government opposed by a Labour opposition. The 
Liberal Democrat vote collapsed and their position as the most prominent third party was taken 
by the SNP who gained fifty MPs—almost a complete sweep of Scottish seats. The Greens and 
UKIP did gain considerably in terms of vote share, but in representation figures remained almost 
where they were before, with one MP each.  
In 2017, a surprise General Election was called by new Prime Minister, Theresa May. 
The short notice made extended discussion about debates impossible, with May refusing to 
participate in a similar debate to the 2015 one. The result of the election also saw a return to the 
two major parties achieving a vote share comparable to post-war figures—they gained over 82% 
of votes and 89% of MPs. This result saw measures of multipartyism reverse; the ENEP dropped 
to 2.89 and the ENPP to 2.48. This result shows that, despite the gains made by smaller parties, 
they are still minor players. They do not have a large loyal voting base, and they do not have the 
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political power to force the two big parties into a debate. The results here however question 
whether that would even be something they would wish to do. 
Of course, this research makes no attempt to evaluate the ultimate influence of the debate 
on voters, which is naturally the most important consideration in election debates. Televised 
debates are still new to the UK political arena, and their influence and power needs to be better 
understood. This research also only considered the one debate. A fuller understanding of their 
influence needs to consider the debates about the debates also—what forces were involved in 
establishing the eventually decided upon format? As previously alluded to, months of 
negotiations took place between parties and broadcasters before the format was decided—it may 
be the case that more could be learned about the role and influence (or lack of) of the debate 
from an analysis of those discussions than the actual debate content itself. Such analysis was far 
beyond the scope of this investigation, and it may not even be an investigation possible to 
pursue—the details of the debate discussions were not made public (see BBC 2015a, 2015b, for 
some details on this). 
Nancy Fraser (1993), in her critique of public sphere theory, argues that for a public 
sphere to exist it requires the elimination of all social inequality. Clearly Fraser was discussing a 
wider social inequality than the differences in political standing between party leaders, but her 
point can again be used analogously. It is difficult to conceive of how political power inequality 
could be eliminated given the extant voting system within the UK. However, it does appear that 
even in this enclosed space containing seven people, a sphere was often absent and something 
more akin to Cunningham’s (2001) “sphericules” occurred (to extend the analogy). Cameron and 
Miliband debated within one, immigration formed another containing Farage with other leaders 
being sucked in occasionally, and Leanne Wood and Natalie Bennett were largely relegated to 
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their own. Debates are a likely permanent fixture to the election landscape, but it is unclear 
currently, given the variety of debate/interview formats adopted in 2017, what they may look like 
in future elections. Clearly, one debate was never going to change the political landscape and 
decades of political orthodoxy predicted how the debate would likely unfold; it would have been 
remarkable had these findings not reported such an imbalance.  Yet it was sold to the British 
public as an event to ameliorate the competitive disadvantage of the smaller parties. That was not 
achieved—the debate fell short of providing an equitable deliberative platform for all those 
invited, what that means for both academia and the political system is worth further 
consideration.  




1. Since the wartime coalition government, UK governance was shared between Labour or 
Conservative administrations until the 2010 General Election which resulted in a 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition. In 1945, Labour and the Conservatives 
shared 84% of the vote. In 1997 they shared 75%, in 2015, 67% and 2017, 82%.  
2. Biggest here refers to in terms of national polling figures. Northern Ireland parties had 
more electoral seats than some of the debate invitees but were not present in this debate. 
A separate debate was held in Northern Ireland. 
3. During the debate, the other two participants, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and 
Conservative leader, David Cameron, frequently agreed with Nick Clegg and this phrase 
was used several times—a fact picked up by numerous commentators. 
4. The Northern Ireland parties are not included in these figures. These parties only compete 
electorally in Northern Ireland and these parties were not invited to the debates. It is of 
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